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Abstract
Lagging public-sector investment in infrastructure and the deregulation of many
industries mean that the private sector has to make decisions under multiple sources
of uncertainty. We analyse such investment decisions by accounting for both multiple
sources of uncertainty and the time-to-build aspect. The latter feature arises in the
energy and transportation sectors because investors can decide the rate at which the
project is completed. Furthermore, two explicit sources of uncertainty represent the dis-
counted cash inflows and outflows of the completed project. We use a finite-difference
scheme to solve numerically the option value and the optimal investment threshold.
Somewhat counterintuitively, with a relatively long time to build, a reduction in the
growth rate of the discounted operating cost may actually lower the investment thresh-
old. This is contrary to the outcome when the stepwise aspect is ignored in a model
with uncertain price and cost. Hence, research and development (R&D) efforts to en-
hance emerging technologies may be more relevant for infrastructure projects with long
lead times.
Managerial Relevance Statement
The deregulation of energy and transportation sectors over the past three decades was in-
tended to foster technology adoption. Indeed, most industrialised countries experienced a
lag in public-sector investment at precisely the same time that infrastructure upgrades were
required. In this context, the private sector could have a role in catalysing both research and
development (R&D) as well as adoption of new technologies, e.g., electric vehicles. However,
launching new technologies is confounded by multiple sources of uncertainty, e.g., both in
revenues and costs, along with a non-negligible time to build associated with the underlying
infrastructure. We take the perspective of a plug-in electric vehicle aggregator construct-
ing charging infrastructure to focus on how these two features interact in determining the
optimal investment timing for the new technology. In particular, when the discounted op-
erating cost decreases, the investment threshold for launching the new technology actually
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decreases under a relatively long time to build. This is in contrast to the outcome under
both (i) a negligible time to build and (ii) a high growth rate for discounted revenues in a
time-to-build model without discounted operating costs. Hence, our enhancement to the real
options framework supports policymakers and practitioners in assessing their R&D strategies
for emerging infrastructure-based technologies.
2
1 Introduction
Public investment in infrastructure, such as power grids, telecommunications, and transport,
in OECD countries has languished since the 1990s [1], dropping from a mean of over 4% of
GDP in 1990 to 3% in 2007. In conjunction with a transition towards service-based economies
in many OECD countries, the resulting “infrastructure gap” could have serious consequences
for their competitiveness. While newly industrialising countries have the comparative luxury
of developing their infrastructure now, infrastructure in OECD countries is decades old in
many sectors and faces a lack of public funding. For example, spending on roads, rail,
and inland waterways in the G7 had averaged less than 1% of GDP in each year over
the past decade [2]. In effect, the trend towards deregulation has in the past thirty years
put more emphasis on private provision of infrastructure investment, which is confounded
by the exposure to uncertain revenues and costs in decision making. While public-private
partnerships in emerging economies may be brokered to incentivise investment without direct
exposure to market risk, investors, nevertheless, face other uncertainties, viz., political risk
and exchange rate fluctuations. The former, in particular, could deter private investors if
it can lead to re-possession of divested assets or re-negotiation of contracts due to evolving
political considerations. For example, five utilities in Tanzania were opened up to private
vendors in 2003 but were affected by re-possession by the government during 2010-2011 [3].
Due to the private sector’s greater role in handling infrastructure investments, concerns
about managing uncertainty in the context of maximising profit have become more impor-
tant. For example, John Laing PLC, a British private equity firm that develops and operates
public infrastructure, has recently announced its intention to raise capital through a flotation
on the London Stock Exchange to finance a fund for environmental infrastructure and is aim-
ing to provide annual returns of 8% [4]. Thus, the introduction of private incentives into the
public sphere necessitates the development and application of appropriate decision-making
methods, which consider uncertainty in cash flows, managerial flexibility, and salient features
of infrastructure projects. The analyses may also provide insights to regulators in designing
mechanisms that elicit desired outcomes, e.g., environmental or social, from a private sector
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that has profit maximisation as its principal motivation.
In this paper, we use the real options approach [5] to examine an infrastructure project
that is to be carried out by a private firm. Similar to [6], we assume that the firm has the
discretion not only to decide when to launch the project but also to determine the rate at
which its construction proceeds. Indeed, large infrastructure projects can take years or even
decades to build, and once construction is initiated, the cash flows may fluctuate to the
point where it is optimal at times for the firm to suspend construction temporarily. Thus,
an optimal decision rule is characterised by a threshold that indicates the minimum revenues
from the completed project for every possible realisation of discounted operating costs and
remaining investment. If the discounted revenue level is above this threshold, then the next
tranche of investment is undertaken; otherwise, it is optimal to suspend investment.
Motivated by the fact that next-generation infrastructure projects, e.g., for smart grids or
plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), may have both uncertain and non-cointegrated discounted
revenues and operating costs in both industrialised and emerging economies, we extend [6] to
the case of two sources of uncertainty. We find that this feature has a non-monotonic effect on
the optimal investment threshold for investment when the discounted operating cost is high
and its growth rate decreases. Intuitively, with almost no time to build, a reduction in this
growth rate increases the investment threshold monotonically because the marginal benefit of
waiting (related to a higher expected net present value) increases by more than its marginal
cost (stemming from the value of forgone cash flows in the interim period). However, with a
relatively long time to build, a reduction in the growth rate of the discounted operating cost
may actually lower the investment threshold as the marginal benefit from a higher expected
net present value (NPV) is discounted more heavily and the marginal cost of waiting is the
option value to continue with a staged project. This effect–which is especially pronounced
when the discounted operating cost is high–is contrary to the finding in [6] that a higher
growth rate for the discounted revenues increases the investment threshold.
4
2 Literature Review
In contrast to the now-or-never NPV approach, the real options framework reflects the value
of managerial flexibility in response to unfolding uncertainties. For example, [7] examine the
value of the deferral option in which a firm waits for the optimal time to invest when both
revenues and investment costs are uncertain. Embedded options, such as the discretion to
suspend and resume operations [8], expand or modify the project after initial investment [9],
and determine the capacity of the project [10, 11, 12, 13], may also be handled. The frame-
work can also be extended to tackle technological uncertainty [14] as well as the management
of portfolios of R&D projects [15]. Such flexibility is often present in real projects and can
affect the initial investment decision regarding selection of efficient vehicles [16]. Unlike the
now-or-never NPV approach, the real options framework helps assess effects of these features
on the value of the investment opportunity and optimal adoption thresholds [5].
A simplifying assumption in most of the real options literature is that the project is
constructed immediately after the investment decision has been taken. In other words,
the rate of investment is infinite, which is defensible only if lead times are low relative to
the lifetime of the project. However, this assumption does not hold in most infrastructure
projects: for instance, transmission lines for electricity may take several years to construct
with several stages encompassing the securing of planning permission to assembling the
towers to restoring the land [17].
Relaxing the assumption of an infinite investment rate, [6] consider a firm that faces
an uncertain value of a completed project and has discretion over not only initiation of
the investment cycle but also suspension and resumption of the investment process as each
stage is completed. Thus, the optimal decision rule involves a trigger value for each stage
that depends on the remaining investment until project completion. In effect, they have
embedded options to manage the time to build and show that this additional flexibility
reinforces the standard real options result that higher volatility and the effective growth rate
of the revenues delay action. More concretely, the state variable in [6], Vt, is defined as the
market value at time t of a completed factory that evolves exogenously and stochastically
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throughout the building phase. Consequently, even though the factory may still be under
construction, the investor can observe the market value of a typical finished factory and
decides at each point in time whether to continue with construction or to suspend it. Once
construction is complete, the investor receives a finished factory at its market value. [6] define
Kt as the investment amount (in $, for example) remaining at time t, where Kt decreases at
rate It, which is controlled by the investor. Now, if it is optimal for investment to proceed
to the next stage, then the investor will simply proceed at the maximum rate k, i.e., It = k.
The decision to continue or to suspend the construction given the current level of remaining
investment outlay, K, depends on a threshold V ∗(K): at each point in time, the investor
checks the market value of a finished factory to see if it is above this threshold. Once Kt = 0
at, say, t = T , the building phase is completed, and the investor receives an active factory
worth VT .
By contrast, [18] present a model with investment lags and an embedded option to
abandon the project costlessly after its completion. Because the marginal costs of waiting,
i.e., the forgone revenues from not investing, are higher due to the lag until cash flows are
received and the abandonment option that puts a lower bound on the value of those cash
flows, the standard real options result is weakened or even reversed: higher uncertainty
may reduce the investment trigger. [19] extends the issue of investment lags to include
competition.
[20] develop quasi-analytical solutions to problems when both revenues and operating
costs are uncertain. In contrast to [7], they relax the assumption that the project’s payoff is
homogenous in the revenues and costs because it is operating costs rather than the invest-
ment cost that may be more prone to uncertainty. Consequently, the dimension-reducing
step from [7] of turning the partial differential equation (PDE) into an ordinary differential
equation (ODE) no longer holds, and the optimal investment trigger is not a linear rela-
tionship between revenues and costs. [20] motivate their work in the context of renewal
assets, while [21] apply a similar model to the case of commodity switching in a production
plant. An important consideration of this strand of the literature is that often revenues and
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operating costs cannot be modelled together as a single stochastic process that describes the
profit flow because the two processes are not cointegrated. Indeed, for infrastructure projects
concerning new technologies, e.g., smart grids or PEVs, there is not even a time series of
the relevant revenues and operating costs from which to detect the presence of cointegration.
Taking this point of view, our work also makes a methodological enhancement to real options
by tackling the time-to-build attribute together with multiple uncertain factors.
3 Analytical Model
3.1 Assumptions
We extend [6] by considering two stochastic variables that determine the value of the project.
Likewise, our work could also be thought of as adding investment lags to the two-factor
model of [20]. As a specific example, we may consider the problem of a PEV aggregator
that controls charging decisions via direct load control (DLC). In [22], such an entity must
make trading decisions in various electricity markets, ranging from forward contracts to
day-ahead to balancing. Although the bulk of electricity trading occurs day-ahead, the
balancing market is becoming increasingly important due to the penetration of intermittent
variable renewable energy sources. Thus, by using PEVs as mobile storage devices, the PEV
aggregator is able to profit from arbitrage between trading platforms. However, it must first
plan to build the charging infrastructure for PEVs, which takes time to build and over which
the PEV aggregator has discretion regarding investment progress. Hence, we characterise its
discounted revenues as arbitrage profits and discounted operating costs as expenses related
to maintaining the infrastructure and the ICT services necessary to manage the PEV fleet.
The dynamics in our model are similar to those of [6] except that instead of a single
variable like Vt (which cannot become negative due to the geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
assumption) that reflects the market value of the finished project, we have both (i) the
market value of the discounted revenue from the finished project, Vt (arbitrage profit from
PEV aggregation), and (ii) the market value of the discounted operating costs of the finished
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project, Ct (expenditure of managing the charging infrastructure and providing ICT services
to implement the trading strategy with the PEVs). Consequently, in our model, the market
value of the completed project is Vt − Ct, which may, indeed, be negative. As in [6], our
PEV aggregator continuously monitors the market values of the discounted revenues and
costs associated with the completed infrastructure to decide whether or not to proceed to
the next phase of construction.1 However, unlike [6], our PEV aggregator’s optimal decision
rule given the current discounted operating cost, C, and the current remaining investment
required, K, is a free boundary, V ∗(C,K), rather than a single threshold, V ∗(K). More
important, although Vt − Ct may become negative at any point, our PEV aggregator could
still decide to proceed with construction provided that Vt exceeds V
∗(C,K). This is a key
difference from [6] in terms of optimal decision making.
We assume that the option to invest in the project is perpetual, i.e., without any expira-
tion date.2 We also assume that Vt and Ct follow the GBMs
dVt = αV Vtdt+ σV Vtdzt (1a)
dCt = αCCtdt+ σCCtdwt (1b)
where αV and αC are drift rates, σV ≥ 0 and σC ≥ 0 are volatilities, and dzt and dwt
are increments of uncorrelated Wiener processes. We take the increments of the GBMs
to be uncorrelated as they are assumed to arise from non-cointegrated time series. How-
ever, instantaneous correlation between the two increments could arise, e.g., due to higher
ICT/infrastructure maintenance costs resulting from more frequent charging/discharging
patterns by PEVs triggered by more volatile electricity prices. Such correlation would be
straightforward to implement.
1Admittedly, Vt and Ct will have to be estimated using proxies: in our example with the PEV aggre-
gator, the discounted revenues and operating costs can be adequately approximated by arbitrage profits in
electricity markets and ICT/infrastructure maintenance costs. However, if the project involves launching a
fundamentally different product, e.g., smartphones in the year 2007, where market value cannot be readily
approximated because of the lack of close substitutes, then another layer of uncertainty is involved because
the value of the underlying asset cannot be observed.
2The benefit of assuming a perpetual option is that it relieves us from making the option value an explicit
function of time.
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The assumption of constant drift and volatility parameters of GBMs in (1a) and (1b)
implies that the investor cannot affect the evolution of Vt and Ct. In the case of Vt, this
is essentially a perfect market assumption, i.e., the investor takes the market value of the
output of the project as given. In the case of Ct, the interpretation depends on the situation.
If αC = 0, then the interpretation is simply that the evolution of the discounted operating
cost variable is stochastic yet without a trend. When αC > 0, the interpretation is that the
discounted operating costs are expected to increase in the long run. For example, if the main
cost determinant of the finished project is a diminishing natural resource, then the costs of
production may rise because the price of this resource will increase in the future.
By contrast, if αC < 0, then we can consider the case of new technology adoption, e.g.,
PEVs and a charging infrastructure. If the adoption of PEVs is in line with the goals of pol-
icymakers, then they might support the R&D required to initiate private-sector investment
and further accelerate the adoption process. In this case, it is also feasible for policymakers
to make their information and progress available to the public so that the private sector can
capitalise on the evolving technology, thereby fulfilling the goals behind the public invest-
ments.3 This implies that the private investor, in our case, experiences an exogenous learning
curve effect that decreases the discounted operating costs of the finished project over time.
Hence, by considering the case αC < 0, we can examine how an exogenous learning curve
effect described above affects the actions of rational investors.
Following [6], we model the investment process so that the capital investment left at time
t is Kt, the investment rate is It, and the maximum investment rate is k ≥ 0. Thus, the
dynamics of Kt are as follows:
dKt
dt
= −It, 0 ≤ It ≤ k (2)
We assume that the PEV aggregator can continuously adapt the rate at which she invests
3According to the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission [23], about 65% of the outstanding
total European PEV RD&D budget of e1.9 billion is from public funding. The report also finds that an
increased exchange of information between the projects would result in a better societal return for the
investments due to the exogenous learning effects described above.
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as new information about the expected profitability of the finished project arrives. This
implies that our framework is most relevant in modelling situations in which the investment
is made in multiple stages and the investor can suspend the investment between the stages.4
If the investor has an opportunity to suspend the process during the stages, then our model
is even more relevant. In fact, the more irreversible the investment process becomes, the
less appropriate our model is in describing the optimal investment behaviour. With such
irreversibility, the model of [18] should be employed, which will lead to different results.
Irreversibility in our context means that any sunk investment costs, i.e., in terms of decreasing
K, cannot be recovered. However, there is some flexibility for the PEV aggregator since it
can suspend construction indefinitely between stages. In effect, once construction is started,
it is not necessarily seen through to completion at the highest possible rate, e.g., as in [18].
Thus, our model provides the decision maker with more discretion.
Since we use the dynamic programming approach to value the investment option, we
denote the firm’s required rate of return with ρ ≥ 0. As is typical with dynamic programming,
ρ is interpreted as an exogenous parameter that represents the cost of maintaining the
investment opportunity. We assume ρ > αV in order to rule out the case that it would be
never optimal to exercise the option to invest.
3.2 Problem Formulation
Given initial values V ≡ V0, C ≡ C0, and K ≡ K0, we denote the value of the option to
invest as F (V,C,K).5 The option value in (V,C,K) ∈ X ≡ (0,∞)× (0,∞)× (0,∞) given
the investment policy I∗(V,C,K) ≡ I can be obtained from the following Bellman equation:
ρF = max
I∈[0,k]
(
E[dF ]
dt
− I
)
(3)
4The state variables’ time indices are omitted since we consider the return equilibrium at the current
time, i.e., V = V0, C = C0, and K = K0. Likewise, the time index for It is omitted without loss of generality
since [6] point out that it will be either 0 or k, which is the maximum rate at which investment can proceed:
if we did not have the time-to-build issue, then k would simply be infinity, which is the case in most real
options papers.
5The option valuation can be implemented for any starting point and not only t = 0. Without loss of
generality, we start the valuation at time zero.
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Note that dF is a function of I, and dt in the denominator means that the expression in the
nominator is divided by the increment of time and not differentiated with respect to time.
Intuitively, Eq. (3) states that the instantaneous return on the investment opportunity is
equal to its net appreciation if it were managed optimally. By expanding dF using Itoˆ’s
lemma and taking the expected value, we obtain:
ρF = max
I∈[0,k]
(
1
2
σ2V V
2FV V +
1
2
σ2CC
2FCC + αV V FV + αCCFC − IFK − I
)
(4)
Since the expression to be maximised with respect to I is linear in I, if it is optimal to
invest at all, then it is also optimal to invest at the maximum rate k. Therefore, the optimal
investment policy is “bang-bang” control as in [6].
Following [20], we use backward induction to obtain first the value of the option to invest
when it is optimal to continue the investment program. This is separated from the option
value in the waiting region by a continuous surface V ∗(C,K) in X so that it is optimal to
invest if V ≥ V ∗(C,K) and to wait otherwise. This assumption is based on the intuition
that the option value is increasing in V . Thus, we denote the option value in the investment
region R ≡ X ∩ {V ≥ V ∗(C,K)} with F and in the waiting region W ≡ X \ R with f .
Under this assumption, the option value functions in the two regions are given by PDEs
obtained by re-arranging Eq. (4):
1
2
σ2V V
2FV V +
1
2
σ2CC
2FCC + αV V FV + αCCFC − kFK − ρF − k = 0 in R (5a)
1
2
σ2V V
2fV V +
1
2
σ2CC
2fCC + αV V fV + αCCfC − ρf = 0 in W (5b)
Note that only Eq. (5a) contains partial derivatives with respect to K as no investment
occurs in W .
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The appropriate boundary conditions for the problem are:
F (V,C, 0) = max{V − C, 0} (6a)
limV→0 f(V,C,K) = 0 (6b)
limC→∞ f(V,C,K) = 0 (6c)
F (V ∗(C,K), C,K) = f(V ∗(C,K), C,K) (6d)
FV (V
∗(C,K), C,K) = fV (V ∗(C,K), C,K) (6e)
FC(V
∗(C,K), C,K) = fC(V ∗(C,K), C,K) (6f)
Eq. (6a) is simply the payoff of the option when there is no investment requirement remain-
ing,6 which holds at the point in time, say t = T , when the building phase is complete, i.e.,
KT = 0, and the PEV aggregator receives the completed infrastructure: if it turns out that
VT −CT < 0, then the infrastructure will not be taken into use. Eq. (6b) states that when V
reaches zero, the option becomes worthless because zero is an absorbing barrier to the GBM
given by Eq. (1a). Eq. (6c) means that the option value converges to zero as the discounted
operating costs of the finished project grow arbitrarily large. Eq. (6d) is the value-matching
condition stitching together the two option values along the free boundary, V ∗(C,K). Eqs.
(6e) and (6f) are the smooth-pasting conditions, which are first-order conditions for making
optimal transitions across the free boundary. Note that now there are two smooth-pasting
conditions as there are two stochastic variables.7
6By considering max{V − C, 0}, we also take care of the boundary conditions limV→∞ FV (V,C,K) =
e−(ρ−αV )
K
k and limC→0 FC(V,C,K) = −e−(ρ−αC)Kk because the NPV rule is to invest only if
e−ρ
K
k
(
V eαV
K
k − CeαC Kk
)
− kρ
(
1− e−ρKk
)
≥ 0.
7[24] comment that accounting for smooth pasting with respect to K omitted by [6] will result in a lower
free boundary. Although they demonstrate that the discrepancy is larger for higher volatility and growth
rate, the qualitative findings about the impact of the time to build on option value from [6] are unchanged.
In order to have directly comparable results, we build on the results of [6].
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3.3 Quasi-Analytical Solution
A general solution to Eq. (5b) is of the form
f(V,C,K) = A(K)V β(K)Cη(K) (7)
where A(K) is an endogenous constant to be determined and coefficients β(K) and η(K)
must satisfy the condition
1
2
σ2V β(β − 1) +
1
2
σ2Cη(η − 1) + αV β + αCη − ρ = 0 (8)
for each value of K. We use short-hand notation for β(K) and η(K) here. By “general
solution,” we mean that any linear combination of functions of the form given by Eq. (7)
satisfies the PDE given by Eq. (5b). Eq. (8) has solutions in all four quadrants of the (β, η)-
plane [20]. However, we can rule out three of the four quadrants by using the boundary
conditions given by Eqs. (6b) and (6c). Doing so, we obtain that β(K) > 0 and η(K) < 0,
i.e., the option value increases (decreases) with discounted revenues (operating costs) in line
with economic intuition. From now on, we will assume that the solution to PDE (5b) is
f(V,C,K) = A(K)V β(K)Cη(K), where (β(K), η(K)) ∈ (0,∞) × (−∞, 0) ∀ K ∈ (0,∞) so
that Eq. (8) holds. A(K) must be solved for by using the other boundary conditions and
the option value in R.
Since the PDE in the investment region has no analytical solutions, we use a numerical
approach based on an explicit finite-difference method to solve the rest of the investor’s
problem. However, now that we know the form of the analytical solution in the waiting
region, we can write boundary conditions (6d)-(6f) in a more convenient form. By inserting
the quasi-analytical solution given by Eq. (7) into the conditions mentioned above, we find
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that the following conditions must be met at the free boundary:
F (V ∗(C,K), C,K)
FV (V ∗(C,K), C,K)
=
V ∗(C,K)
β(K)
(9a)
F (V ∗(C,K), C,K)
FC(V ∗(C,K), C,K)
=
C
η(K)
(9b)
where β(K) and η(K) satisfy Eq. (8). We will utilise conditions (9a) and (9b) to determine
the free boundary numerically. Once the free boundary is obtained, we can solve for the
values of A(K), β(K), and η(K) for each discrete value of K. The numerical solution
method is in further detail in Appendix A.
4 Numerical Examples
We present the results of the model in two parts. First, we consider a base case and provide
a discussion of the results in general. Next, we present the most interesting results by
performing comparative statics to isolate the effects of individual parameters on the investor’s
optimal investment policy.
4.1 Base Case
For the base case, we assume that the total investment required to finish the investment
program is K = 6 (Me) and the maximum investment rate is k = 1 (Me/year). This
implies that the minimum time to complete the investment program is six years and that
the unit of time is years. We set αV = 0.04 and σV = 0.14 in this section and consider
a case in which the drift and volatility of Ct are the same as those of Vt (αC = 0.04 and
σC = 0.14),
8 where V and C represent the current discounted revenues and operating costs
of the completed project. Finally, we assume that the discount rate is ρ = 0.08.
8If we were considering an all-equity firm that consisted only of the investment opportunity studied here,
then the base case values would imply that the volatility of the firm’s stock is approximately
√
0.142 + 0.142 =
19.8%. Considering that the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options sold on the Chicago Board
Options Exchange is usually around 20%, the assumptions made on the volatilities of the processes are fairly
realistic.
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Figure 1: Option value, free boundary, and NPV threshold when K = 6
Figure 1 shows the level sets of the option value (contour curves with numbers indicating
the option value for every combination of V and C when K = 6) and the free boundary (solid
black line) in the base case when K = 6. The option value is increasing in V and decreasing
in C as intuition suggests, which is the case for other values of K as well. The black line
indicating the position of the free boundary, V ∗(C,K = 6), tells the PEV aggregator when to
proceed with construction if K = 6, e.g., the minimum V required to continue construction
when C = 15 is approximately 40.9 At (V,C) = (40, 15), the option value is approximately
20 as indicated by the contour curve passing through that point. As expected, the investment
threshold increases in C. Note also that the free boundary is not a level set of the option
value. Therefore, we cannot, in general, draw a straight connection between the option value
and the location of the investment threshold.
The red dashed line in Figure 1 shows the NPV investment threshold assuming that the
entire investment is finished at the full rate if it is optimal to invest, i.e., the PEV aggregator
9The free boundary does not appear smooth because of the numerical finite-difference method used to
solve the problem.
15
Figure 2: Option value surface, now-or-never NPV, and free boundary when K = 6 (z-axis
measures option value and now-or-never NPV)
ignores the discretion to suspend construction. Since the NPV rule, by definition, is obtained
by calculating the expected cash flows of the completed project net of the initial investment
costs, its use leads to investment in cases when it is optimal to wait according to the real
options rule. For example, considering again the case when C = 15, the NPV rule tells the
PEV aggregator to proceed with construction when V is at least 20. Therefore, there must
be other reasons than the initial investment cost for the free boundary, V ∗(C,K = 6), to be
above the NPV threshold. First, since both Vt and Ct evolve stochastically in time, there is a
chance that the investment opportunity might increase in value over time. This implies that
there are benefits to waiting that are not present in the NPV analysis. Second, as there is
uncertainty in the value of the finished project due to the time-to-build aspect, it is optimal
to wait longer than the NPV rule suggests in order to cover this uncertainty by waiting for
the expected value of the finished project to rise well above the NPV rule.
Figure 2 shows the option value surface (measured on the z-axis), the now-or-never NPV,
and the projection of the free boundary onto the option value surface when K = 6. The
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Figure 3: Free boundaries in the base case for different values of K
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are satisfied by the numerical solution as
the option values in the investing and waiting regions meet smoothly at the free boundary.
Also, the option value is non-negative for all values of (V,C). A comparison of the option
value and the NPV indicates that the option value is greater than the NPV for all values
of (V,C), thereby reflecting the fact that real options analysis considers also the value of
waiting and the possibility to vary the investment rate. By contrast, the now-or-never NPV
approach ignores this managerial flexibility. As in Figure 1, we can examine in Figure 2
how much the option value and now-or-never NPV are worth for a given combination, e.g.,
(V,C) = (40, 15), along with the respective investment thresholds. We also notice that the
difference between the option value and the NPV converges to zero as V increases and C
decreases. This happens because then the investment program will be completed almost
certainly at full pace yielding, on average, a total payoff that equals the NPV.
Figure 3 shows the investment thresholds for various values of K in the base case. The
threshold curves are increasing in C for each value of K because the value of the finished
project is decreasing in C. Also, in the base case, the investment thresholds increase in
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K. This is due to two reasons. First, the remaining initial investment cost increases in
K. Second, the uncertainty over the value of the payoff when the investment program is
completed is increasing in K because a large value of K indicates that the minimum time-
to-build is large as well. We discuss this feature further in Section 4.2.2. In summary,
Figure 3 can be used as a decision rule for the PEV aggregator: since we have implicitly
assumed that the investor can observe V , C, and K at each point in time, she may use the
investment thresholds at different values of K as a guide on how to proceed optimally with
the construction of the charging infrastructure.
4.2 Comparative Statics
4.2.1 Sensitivity with Respect to the Growth Rate
As our main motivation is to gain insight into how the inclusion of uncertain discounted
operating costs of the completed project affects the investor’s choices, we first discuss the
mechanics behind the effects of αC on the investor’s optimal behaviour in detail. Figure 4
illustrates the investment thresholds at different values of K for various values of αC while
holding the other parameters the same as in the base case. For the smaller values of K, i.e.,
when the remaining time to build is negligible, the effect of αC on the results is monotonic: a
decrease in αC shifts the investment threshold up and, thus, increases the incentive to wait.
Intuitively, lowering αC increases the value of the option to wait as the expected discounted
operating cost upon completion of the project will be lower. This is precisely the finding of
[7], i.e., a model without time to build and an NPV that depends homogeneously on two
stochastic processes.10
When K  0, the time-to-build aspect is non-negligible and may have a subtle effect
on how the growth rate affects the optimal investment threshold. In particular, Figure
4 illustrates that when αC decreases from 0.08 to -0.10, V
∗(C,K = 6) increases, but as
αC decreases further, V
∗(C,K = 6) actually decreases. This non-monotonic impact of αC
on V ∗(C,K = 6) is more pronounced when the discounted operating costs are higher. In
10It can be shown numerically that V ∗(C,K) converges to the analytical results of [7] when K → 0.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of the free boundary with respect to αC
order to explain this seemingly counterintuitive result, we first examine the cases with low
discounted operating costs: in Figure 4, as αC is decreased, V
∗(C,K = 6) increases for low
values of C. This effectively recovers the result of [6] in which an increase in αV (equivalent
to a decrease in αC here) increases V
∗(C,K). Indeed, an increase in the growth rate of the
discounted revenues increases the incentive to wait both due to (i) a higher expected NPV
of a completed project and (ii) a lower value of flexibility related to managing the rate of
construction during the time to build. Likewise, in our model, for low values of C, a decrease
in αC will increase V
∗(C,K) due to the same two dynamics.
However, for high values of C, the value of flexibility over the construction rate increases
19
with decreases in αC . Thus, if αC is low enough, then the increase in the value of flexibility
during the time to build will more than offset the increased incentive to wait for a higher
expected NPV, thereby reversing the results of [6]. This is seen in the bottom two panels of
Figure 4 as V ∗(C,K = 6) becomes lower when αC decreases for high C.
The results in Figure 4 can also be viewed in terms of the impact of K on the investment
threshold. First, for low C, the threshold increases with K regardless of the value of αC .
Intuitively, a higher K increases the incentive to wait because it increases the required net
discounted revenues to cover the investment cost. Moreover, since low C results in a negligible
value of flexibility over managing the investment program optimally, it is unaffected by an
increase in K. Therefore, an increase in K increases the investment threshold for low C for
any given αC .
When C is relatively high, the impact of K on the investment threshold depends on the
growth rate of the discounted operating costs: for a high (low) αC , the threshold increases
(decreases) with K. As with low C, a higher K leads to an increase in the threshold for high
αC as there is an incentive to wait longer to cover the higher investment costs without a
substantial increase in the value of flexibility over managing the rate of construction. Indeed,
when αC is high, the expected payoff from exercising the option to obtain the project at time
t+ s given information at time t, Ft, is E[(V −C)t+s|Ft] = VteαV s−CteαCs, which is “out of
the money” for high αC . By contrast, this option becomes “in the money” for low αC when
C is high. Thus, an increase in K increases the duration during which the PEV aggregator
has flexibility over managing the rate of construction.
The effect of αV on the results is similar to that of αC . An increase in αV increases the
benefits of waiting and shifts the investment threshold V ∗(C,K = 0.01) upwards. Again,
the investment thresholds at larger values of K are located in a way that once the first
initial investment is made, the investor will, on average, be able to invest continuously at
the maximum rate up to the end of the investment program. We should also note that
the investment thresholds grow without boundaries as αV → ρ (assuming that αV > αC)
since then the long-term capital rate of return of the payoff converges to ρ and the cost of
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waiting diminishes. Finally, as ρ represents the cost of waiting in our model, the effect of an
increase in ρ is to shift the investment threshold down for all values of K and, thus, hasten
investment.
4.2.2 Sensitivity with Respect to the Time to Build
As our explanation for the results above relies on the logic that the investor holding the
option considers both the expected evolution of V − C during the investment period and
the optimal investment policy at smaller values of K when making decisions on whether to
invest or wait, we would assume that the results of the comparative statics above would be
amplified for smaller values of k since this would imply a longer time to build. Consider,
for example, the case where αC < 0 and C is expected to decrease while V is expected to
increase. Now, if we decrease the maximum investment rate, then we expect that it is optimal
to start investing at even higher values of C given a value of V since the minimum time to
build is longer, thereby implying that the expected decrease of C during the investment
period is larger as well. By generalising the logic above, we would assume that a decrease
in k would amplify the results of the comparative statics above. Motivated by this, we will
next analyse the results of the same comparative statics as above using a smaller maximum
investment rate, k = 0.5. This doubles the minimum time-to-build for every value of K in
comparison to the value k = 1 used above.
Figure 5 shows the results of the comparative statics with respect to αC when k = 0.5
and the other parameters are the same as in the base case. We note that our intuition is
correct as the smaller value of k amplifies the effects of αC on the investment thresholds.
Note that the investment thresholds are not affected by the change in the value of k when
K = 0.01 since then the payoff can be received almost instantly. The reason why the other
thresholds react more dramatically to changes in αC than in the case above is that now the
investor needs to look further ahead in time when making decisions for larger values of K
because the minimum time-to-build is longer.
An interesting result occurs in the lower right case of Figure 5 where αC = −0.20. For
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of the investment threshold with respect to αC when k = 0.5
large values of C and K, it is optimal to invest even if V − C < 0. However, this is
well explained by the expected increase of V − C during the investment program. This
does not contradict the boundary condition (6a) because that refers to whether or not the
infrastructure is accepted upon completion of construction. The result in Figure 5 pertains to
proceeding or not with construction at some intermediate phase. Indeed, it may be profitable
to do so when (i) sufficient time remains to build and (ii) discounted operating costs are
expected to decrease. Also, for each value of C, the NPV rule in this extreme situation is to
invest at a smaller value of V than the real options rule suggests. The observation applies
generally: the real options investment threshold is always larger than the now-or-never NPV
threshold. This strengthens our explanation for why it might be optimal to invest even if the
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current value of the payoff is negative since the fact that the real options threshold is larger
than the NPV threshold in all situations ensures that the average value of the investment
program executed by the real options rule is positive in all cases.
4.2.3 Sensitivity with Respect to the Volatility
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of the investment threshold with respect to σV and σC when αV =
αC = 0.04, k = 1.00, and ρ = 0.08
Figure 6 indicates the sensitivity of the investment threshold with respect to the volatili-
ties when the other parameters are as in the base case.11 The upper graph shows how much
the threshold changes given a value of (C,K) as σV changes from 0.04 to 0.20 and σC = 0.14,
and the lower graph shows how much the threshold changes as σC changes from 0.04 to 0.20
and σV = 0.14. Both graphs reveal that the change in the threshold, i.e., ∆V
∗(C,K), is
positive for all values of (C,K). In fact, the observation holds for all tested parameter val-
ues: V ∗(C,K) is increasing in both σV and σC in all situations. This reflects the well-known
11The lines in the graphs of this subsection are linearised to smooth out noise due to the numerical method
used.
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property of options with convex payoffs: since the payoff max{V − C, 0} is bounded from
below, an increase in the volatility of V − C increases the benefits of waiting and, thus,
increases the investment threshold [6, 7].
A second observation common to both of the graphs in Figure 6 is that ∆V ∗(C,K) is
increasing in C for all values of K. Our interpretation is that this is due to the assumption
that V and C follow GBMs. This assumption implies that the standard deviations of dV
and dC are increasing in σV and σC by Eqs. (1a)-(1b). Therefore, the spread of the future
values of the payoff max{V − C, 0} is more sensitive to the volatilities of V and C when
the values of V and C are large. Thus, the sensitivity of the threshold with respect to the
volatilities is increasing in C given a value of K since for a large value of C the value of V
needs to be large as well in order to investment to occur as V ∗(C,K) is always increasing in
C.
In the upper graph of Figure 6, ∆V ∗(C,K) is increasing in K given a value of C, while
in the lower graph, ∆V ∗(C,K) is slightly decreasing with respect to K given any positive
value of C. The evolution of ∆V ∗(C,K) as a function of K given a value of C depends on
other parameters than the volatilities as well. For example, Figure 7 displays ∆V ∗(C,K)
when αV = 0.04 and αC = −0.20. In this case, ∆V ∗(C,K) is decreasing in K for all values
of C when σC increases. Also, when σV increases, ∆V
∗(C,K) is decreasing in K for large
values of C.
Next, we consider how the distribution of the total volatility of V − C among the
two variables affects the investment threshold. By total volatility, we mean the value of
σtotal =
√
σ2V + σ
2
C . Although σtotal is not an accurate measure of the standard deviation of
d(V − C) = dV − dC as this depends on the value of (V,C), we will use σtotal as a useful
approximation of the volatility of V − C. Then, the question is that how does the invest-
ment threshold change as the value of (σV , σC) is varied so that σtotal remains constant.
Figure 8 depicts such a sensitivity analysis when (σV , σC) evolves according to the chain
(0.20, 0.00) → (0.14, 0.14) → (0.00, 0.20), during which σtotal = 0.20, and αV = αV = 0.04,
k = 1.00, and ρ = 0.08. The figure shows that for large values of K, V ∗(C,K) shifts down
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of the investment threshold with respect to σV and σC when αV = 0.04,
αC = −0.20, k = 1.00, and ρ = 0.08
as σV decreases and σC increases. However, when K = 0.01, the investment threshold does
not change visibly as (σV , σC) is varied so that σtotal remains constant, which is consistent
with the result of [7]. The behaviour of V ∗(C,K) with respect to the distribution of the
volatilities described above is common to all tested parameter values. Hence, we conclude
that when K >> 0, a situation in which most of the uncertainty is due to σV leads to higher
investment thresholds than a situation in which most of the uncertainty stems from σC .
Still, the threshold V ∗(C,K → 0), which governs the completion of the investment program,
depends only on σtotal.
5 Conclusions
Given the trend towards deregulation of many infrastructure industries in OECD countries
as well as the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure investment in emerging
economies, policymakers and the private sector need appropriate valuation methods to sup-
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of the investment threshold with respect to the distribution of σtotal
when αV = 0.04, αC = 0.04, k = 1.00, and ρ = 0.08
port decision making. In particular, investors in infrastructure projects with long lead times
often face multiple sources of uncertainty and have the flexibility to control the rate of their
investment program. In this paper, we propose a method to compute the option value and
the investment thresholds for an investor who sequentially invests in project opportunity
whose payoff is a function of two stochastic variables. The sequential nature of the invest-
ment process is modelled by allowing the investor to choose the rate at which to invest
continuously in time. As the investment rate is assumed to be bounded between zero and a
positive constant, the investor cannot obtain the payoff instantly but has to wait for at least
a minimum time to build.
By enhancing the time-to-build model of [6], we develop an approach to handle infras-
tructure investment in a deregulated paradigm using the example of a PEV aggregator
building charging infrastructure. In addition to the methodological innovation of accounting
for multiple sources of uncertainty, we also demonstrate how conventional results from the
real options literature are partially reversed:
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1. A lower growth rate for the discounted value of the completed project’s operating costs
reduces the investment threshold in contrast to the analogous result from [6].
2. The investment threshold may decrease with the remaining required investment when
the discounted value of the completed project’s operating costs are high.
3. It may be optimal to proceed with investment even when the net discounted cash flows
of the completed project are negative.
We choose Vt and Ct to represent the discounted cash in- and outflows of the completed
project, respectively. We also assume that the value of the completed project at time t is
max{Vt−Ct, 0}. However, the stochastic variables could have other interpretations depending
on which particular investment situation is of interest. Also, the payoff could be generally
any function of Vt and Ct in our framework.
12 In this sense, our model is general and can be
used to analyse multiple investment situations that meet the assumptions about the nature
of the investment process and the stochastic variables.
One of the assumptions of the model is that the investor can decide continuously on
whether to invest or wait in time. As discussed above, this assumption might be an ap-
propriate approximation in some situations. However, if the initial investment decision is
completely irreversible, then our model does not apply. Therefore, the exercise of building
and solving a two-factor model in which the investment decision is modelled following the
lead of [18] could be interesting. In this case, the effect of the volatilities of the processes
that Vt and Ct follow on the results could be in contrast to that in our model. In addition,
it would be interesting to see whether the effect of the drift rates would be similar to that
in our model: for even if the initial investment decision is made completely irreversible, the
investment lag implies that a rational investor considers how the payoff is expected to evolve
during the lag when making investment decisions. Finally, our model could be extended to
incorporate other types of managerial flexibilities, e.g., options to size the capacity of the
completed project or to abandon it during the construction phase, and regime-switching or
12We do not take a stance on which conditions the payoff function should meet in order for the problem
to have a solution.
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stochastic-volatility processes instead of GBMs to reflect the fact that discounted revenues
and operating costs of the completed project may not be adequately approximated by the
market values of any existing assets.
Acknowledgements
This research has been partly supported by the project Platform Value Now funded by the
grant number 293446 of the Strategic Research Council (SRC) of the Academy of Finland.
Siddiqui also acknowledges the support of HEC Montre´al. The authors are grateful to the
department editor and two anonymous referees for their helpful feedback. All remaining
errors are the authors’ own.
Biographies
Lauri Kauppinen received the B.Sc. degree in economics, mathematics, and statistics
from the University of Helsinki, the M.Sc. degree in operations research and strategic man-
agement from Aalto University, and the M.Sc. degree in economics from the University of
Helsinki. He is an Associate with the Boston Consulting Group.
Afzal S. Siddiqui received the B.S. degree from Columbia University, New York, NY,
USA, and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA,
all in industrial engineering and operations research. He is Professor of Energy Economics
in the Department of Statistical Science at University College London, a Professor in the
Department of Computer and Systems Sciences at Stockholm University, and a Visiting Pro-
fessor in the Department of Decision Sciences at HEC Montre´al. His research interests lie
in distributed generation investment under uncertainty, real options analysis of technology
adoption, and strategic interactions in capacity expansion.
Ahti Salo received his M.Sc. and D.Sc. degrees in systems and operations research at
28
the Helsinki University of Technology in 1987 and 1992, respectively. His research inter-
ests include topics in decision analysis, risk analysis, innovation management, and efficiency
analysis. He has published some 80 papers in leading international journals (including Man-
agement Science and Operations Research) and received several awards for his research from
the Decision Analysis Society of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management
Sciences (INFORMS). He has been visiting professor at the London Business School, Uni-
versite´ Paris-Dauphine, and the University of Vienna. Professor Salo has directed a broad
range of basic and applied research projects funded by companies, research institutes, and
public funding agencies.
References
[1] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Pension Funds Investment
in Infrastructure: a Survey. http://www.oecd.org/futures/infrastructureto2030/
48634596.pdf, 2011.
[2] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Infrastructure Investment
(Indicator). https://data.oecd.org/transport/infrastructure-investment.htm
(Accessed on 28 September 2016), 2016.
[3] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Fostering
Investment in Infrastructure: Lessons Learned from OECD Investment
Policy Reviews. https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/
Fostering-Investment-in-Infrastructure.pdf (Accessed on 10 November 2017),
2015.
[4] Financial Times, “John Laing-backed infrastructure fund to float,” http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/9143ddbc-9223-11e3-9e43-00144feab7de.html, 10 February 2014.
[5] A.K. Dixit and R.S. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press,
1994.
29
[6] S. Majd and R.S. Pindyck, “Time to build, option value, and investment decisions,”
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 7–27, 1987.
[7] R. McDonald and D. Siegel, “The value of waiting to invest,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 101, no. 4, pp. 707–727, 1986.
[8] R. McDonald and D. Siegel, “Investment and the valuation of firms when there is an
option to shut down,” International Economic Review, vol. 26, pp. 331–349, 1985.
[9] R.S. Pindyck, “Irreversible investment, capacity choice, and the value of the firm,” The
American Economic Review, vol. 78, no. 7, pp. 969–985, 1988.
[10] A.K. Dixit, “Choosing among alternative lumpy investment projects under uncertainty,”
Economic Letters, vol. 43, pp. 281–285, 1993.
[11] T. Dangl, “Investment and capacity choice under uncertain demand,” European Journal
of Operational Research, vol. 117, pp. 1–14, 1999.
[12] J.-P. De´camps, T. Mariotti, and S. Villeneuve, “Irreversible investment in alternative
projects,” Economic Theory, vol. 28, pp. 425–448, 2006.
[13] M. Chronopoulos, B. De Reyck, and A.S. Siddiqui, “The value of capacity sizing
under risk aversion and operational flexibility,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 272–288, 2013.
[14] R.J. Kauffman and X. Li, “Technology competition and optimal investment timing: a
real options perspective,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, vol. 52, no.
1, pp. 15–29, 2005.
[15] T. van Bommel, R.J. Mahieu, and E.J. Nijssen, “Technology trajectories and the
selection of optimal R&D project sequences,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 669–680, 2014.
[16] E. Baker, “Option value and the diffusion of fuel efficient vehicles,” The Energy Journal,
vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 49–59, 2012.
30
[17] Hydro-Que´bec, “Power transmission: building a line,” http://www.hydroquebec.com/
learning/transport/construction-ligne.html, 2014.
[18] A. Bar-Ilan and W.C. Strange, “Investment lags,” The American Economic Review,
vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 610–622, 1996.
[19] F.L. Aguerrevere, “Equilibrium investment strategies and output price behavior: a real-
options approach,” The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 1239–1272, 2003.
[20] R. Adkins and D. Paxson, “Renewing assets with uncertain revenues and operating
costs,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 785–813, 2011.
[21] J. Dockendorf and D. Paxson (2013), “Continuous rainbow options on commodity out-
puts: what is the real value of switching facilities?,” European Journal of Finance, vol.
19, no. 7–8, pp. 645–673.
[22] I. Momber, A.S. Siddiqui, T. Go´mez, and L. So¨der (2015), “Risk averse scheduling by a
PEV aggregator under uncertainty,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 30, no.
2, pp. 882–891.
[23] European Commission, Paving the Way to Electrified Road Transport: Publicly Funded
Research, Development and Demonstration Projects on Electric and Plug-in Vehicles
in Europe. http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/
JRC79736/report_e-mobility_projecs_final_online.pdf, Joint Research Centre,
EC, Brussels, Belgium, 2013.
[24] A. Milne and A.E. Whalley, “’Time to build, option value, and investment decisions’:
a comment,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 56, pp. 325–332, 2000.
[25] P. Wilmott, Paul Wilmott on Quantitative Finance. John Wiley & Sons, 2007.
31
Appendix A Numerical Solution Method
We first apply the transformation F (V,C,K) = e−ρ
K
k G(X, Y,K), where X = lnV and
Y = lnC, to the PDE given by Eq. (5a) in order to modify the PDE to a simpler form and
to ensure numerical stability. After the transformation, the PDE in R is:
1
2
σ2VGXX +
1
2
σ2CGY Y +
(
αV − 1
2
σ2V
)
GX +
(
αC − 1
2
σ2C
)
GY − kGK − keρKk = 0 (10)
Note that the coefficients of the PDE are now constant. After the transformation, the
boundary conditions that the solution for Eq. (10) must satisfy are:
G(X, Y, 0) = eXY , (11a)
G(X∗(Y,K), Y,K)
GX(X∗(Y,K), Y,K)
= 1
β(K)
(11b)
G(X∗(Y,K), Y,K)
GY (X∗(Y,K), Y,K)
= 1
η(K)
(11c)
where β(K) and η(K) solve Eq. (8) for each value of K.
Since we will solve the PDE numerically in a cubic grid, we need some additional bound-
ary conditions that apply at the boundaries of the grid. For this purpose, we assume the
following second-order boundary conditions:
lim
X→∞
GXX = 0 (12a)
lim
X→−∞
GXX = 0 (12b)
lim
Y→∞
GY Y = 0 (12c)
lim
Y→−∞
GY Y = 0 (12d)
These boundary conditions are chosen since they are known to work well with many financial
options [25] as well as for our model. We will from now require that these conditions are
approximately met at the boundaries of the lattice.
Let us denote G(i∆X, j∆Y, `∆K) = G`i,j, where i ∈ {imin, imin + 1, ..., imax}, j ∈
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{jmin, jmin + 1, ..., jmax}, and ` ∈ {`min, `min + 1, ..., `max}. ∆X, ∆Y , ∆K, and the min-
imum and maximum indices are predetermined constants that govern the dimensions of the
lattice.13 We use the following finite-difference approximations for the partial derivatives of
G:
GX(i∆X, j∆Y, `∆K) =
G`i+1,j−G`i−1,j
2∆X
(13a)
GY (i∆X, j∆Y, `∆K) =
G`i,j+1−G`i,j−1
2∆Y
(13b)
GXX(i∆X, j∆Y, `∆K) =
G`i+1,j−2G`i,j+G`i−1,j
(∆X)2
(13c)
GY Y (i∆X, j∆Y, `∆K) =
G`i,j+1−2G`i,j+G`i,j−1
(∆Y )2
(13d)
GK(i∆X, j∆Y, `∆K) =
G`+1i,j −G`i,j
∆K
(13e)
By inserting the approximations above in the transformed PDE given by Eq. (10), we obtain
the following difference equation:
G`+1i,j = a+G
`
i+1,j + a−G
`
i−1,j + b+G
`
i,j+1 + b−G
`
i,j−1 + cG
`
i,j − n` (14)
where
a+ =
∆K
2k∆X
(
σ2V
∆X
+ αV − σ
2
V
2
)
(15a)
a− = ∆K2k∆X
(
σ2V
∆X
− αV + σ
2
V
2
)
(15b)
b+ =
∆K
2k∆Y
(
σ2C
∆Y
+ αC − σ
2
C
2
)
(15c)
b− = ∆K2k∆Y
(
σ2C
∆Y
− αC + σ
2
C
2
)
(15d)
c = 1− σ2V ∆K
k(∆X)2
− σ2C∆K
k(∆Y )2
(15e)
n` = ∆Ke
ρ `∆K
k (15f)
If the lattice point considered is on the lattice boundary, then we discretise the boundary
conditions given by Eqs. (13a)–(13e). Subsequently, the discretised boundary conditions can
13imin and jmin will be negative in order to obtain option values near the zero border in the (V,C)-world.
The value of `min will be zero.
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be inserted into Eq. (14) to compute the option value at the lattice point.
In terms of the computational method, first we calculate the values of G when ` = 0
using Eq. (11a). Next, we calculate the values of option when ` = 1 using Eq. (14) and the
discretised versions of boundary conditions (13a)–(13e). Now that we know the preliminary
option values at ` = 1, the next task is to find the investment threshold. For this, we use
boundary conditions (11b), (11c), and (8). By combining these conditions, the following
equation must be met on the investment threshold:
1
2
σ2V
GX
G
(
GX
G
− 1
)
+
1
2
σ2C
GY
G
(
GY
G
− 1
)
+ αV
GX
G
+ αC
GY
G
− ρ = 0 (16)
Our strategy is then to evaluate the left-hand side of this equation at every lattice point for
` = 1 by using the finite-difference approximations in Eqs. (13a) and (13b).14 The location
of the investment threshold given a value of j is then the pair (i, j), for which the absolute
value of the left-hand side of Eq. (16) is the smallest in i ∈ {imin + 1, imin + 1, ..., imax− 1}.15
After we have numerically solved for the free boundary for ` = 1, we can obtain the values
of constants A(∆K), β(∆K), and η(∆K) using Eqs. (11b) and (11c), the value-matching
condition in Eq. (6d), the functional transformation, and the form of the analytical solution
in the waiting region given by Eq. (7). We solve for the values of these constants at each
investment threshold for ` = 1 and take the averages of these values to determine the final
values.
After having calculated the initial option values, the placement of the investment thresh-
old, and the constants of the analytical solution in the lower region, we should fill the waiting
region for ` = 1 with the values given by the analytical solution before repeating the pro-
cedure above for ` = 2. However, as this proves to cause numerical instability, we update
the option values after the initial option values and the investment thresholds have been
determined for all values of `. Once the iteration above has been completed for all values of
` and the option values in the waiting region are updated, the final solution for the investor’s
14The locations of the investment threshold at ` = `min and ` = `max are extrapolated.
15Here, we implicitly assume that the investment threshold is not at imin or imax for any value of Y or
K. This assumption is met if the lattice dimensions are chosen properly.
34
problem is obtained by using the functional and variable transformations in the opposite
direction than what was initially done.
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